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Pastorius: Affirmative Action in Admissions

NOTE

THE EROSION OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION:
THE FIFTH CIRCUIT CONTRADICTS THE
SUPREME COURT ON THE ISSUE OF
DIVERSITY

I. INTRODUCTION

The issue of affirmative action in higher education is controversial and of great public interest. 1 The Supreme Court
dealt with the issue in the landmark case of Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke. 2 In 1978, the Bakke Court
held that while the use of racial quotas in University admissions decisions was impermissible, race may be considered as a
factor in admissions in order to establish classroom diversity.3
The Court stipulated however, that race may never be the sole
factor in considering an applicant. 4
In Hopwood et. al. v. State of Texas et. al.,5 the Fifth Circuit openly criticized and contradicted Bakke. 6 Contrary to
Bakke, the Fifth Circuit held that race may never be used as a
factor in admissions decisions. 7 The Hopwood court declared

1. Carol Ness, Business Dodging Debate on Prop. 209, S.F. EXAMINER, September 29, 1996, at C-1; Edward W. Lempinen, Protesters, Police Skirmish as
Duke Debates CCRI, S.F. CHRON., September 26, 1996, at AI.; Edward W.
Lempinen, Cash Drought in CCRI Camps, S.F. CHRON., October I, 1996, at A17.
2. Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
3. [d. at 314-15.
4. [d. at 315.
5. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
6. [d. at 948.
. 7. [d. at 962.
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that diversity based on racial factors does not facilitate the
goals of equal protection.s Consequently, the Fifth Circuit denounced the particular race-based admissions program at issue, as well as all affirmative action plans used for diversity
purposes in higher education admissions. 9

Hopwood involved four white applicants who applied for
admission to the University of Texas School of Law (hereinafter "the Law School") in 1992.10 At that time, the Law School
had a special affirmative action admissions program l l similar
to that in Bakke. Under this special admissions program, a
certain percentage of entering class seats were reserved for
African American and Mexican American applicants. 12
The Law School denied admission to the four white applicants,13 while accepting African American and Mexican American candidates with lower grade point averages and test
scores under the Law School's special admissions program. 14
The four white applicants sued the State and the Law School
for using an affirmative action admissions program. 15 The
plaintiffs' alleged the Law School's affirmative action plan
subjected them to unconstitutional racial discrimination. 16
In applying strict scrutiny to the race-based admissions
policy, the district court ruled that the Law School's special
admissions practice violated the U.S. Constitution. 17 The Fifth
Circuit exceeded the district court's holding by declaring impermissible all race-based affirmative action plans used by the
Law School to establish classroom diversity in higher education.ls
This Comment will begin by examining the facts and pro8. [d. at 944.
9. [d.

10. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 938.
11. [d. at 936-37.
12. [d. at 937.
13. [d. at 938.

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

[d. at 937 n.7.
Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 938.
[d. at 940.
[d. at 938.
[d. at 962.
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cedural history of the Hopwood case. It will discuss background information relevant to understanding affirmative
action and the precedent used by the Fifth Circuit, most notably the Bakke decision. This Comment will also examine the
application of affirmative action in higher education admissions policies. It will evaluate the Fifth Circuit's reasoning for
contradicting Bakke when the Fifth Circuit concluded that
racial considerations are impermissible in admission plans in
higher education. 19 Finally, this Comment proposes that the
Fifth Circuit was hasty in rendering its conclusion.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 1992, Cheryl Hopwood, Douglas Carvell, Kenneth Elliot,
and David Rogers applied for admission as first year law stu.dents to the University of Texas School of Law,20 one of the
nations top 20 law schools. 21 At that time, the Law School's
affirmative action program reserved approximately 10% of its
entering class seats for Mexican Americans and 5% for African
Americans. 22
Due to the large volume of applications received annually
by the Law School, the school employed a decision-making
method called the Texas Index number or ''TI.,,23 The admissions committee calculated the TI number using an applicant's
undergraduate grade point average (GPA) and his or her Law
School Admissions Test (LSAT) score. 24 While not the only
19. [d. at 947-48.
20. Hopwood v. Texas,. 78 F.3d 932, 938 (5th Cir. 1996).
21. [d. at 935.
22. [d. at 937. The purpose of this program was to increase the enrollment of
these particular minority groups. "The stated purpose of this lowering of standards
was to meet an 'aspiration' of admittiIlg a class consisting of 10% Mexican Americans and 5% blacks, proportions roughly comparable to the percentages of those
races graduating from Texas colleges." [d. There was no special admissions program given to any other minority group. [d. at 936 n.4.
23. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 935.
24. [d. The formula was created by the Law School Data Assembly Service
according to a prediction of success of first year law students. To arrive at an
ultimate TI, 60% of the weight was given to an applicant's LSAT score and 40%
was given to the GPA. LSAT scores are calculated using three numbers. The
range of the score is between 120 and 180, with 120 being the lowest score a testtaker can receive and 180 being the highest, or the 100th percentile. The formula
for an applicant with a three number LSAT and GPA was calculated as follows:
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factor used in determining whether to admit an applicant, the
Law School relied heavily on the TI in the admissions process. 25 Using the TI, the Law School sorted applicants into
presumption categories. 26 The Law School used three categories for placing candidates, based on their TI: 27 presumptive
admit, discretionary zone, and presumptive deny.28
The Law School offered admission to almost all candidates
in the presumptive admit category and refused admission to almost all candidates in the presumptive deny category.29 Applicants falling into the discretionary zone received the most
thorough review. 30
As part of the Law School's affirmative action admissions
program, Mrican Americans and Mexican Americans with
lower TI scores than non-minorities were placed in the presumptive admit and discretionary zone categories. 31 In addition, the Law School conducted an application evaluation process based on race and maintained segregated waiting lists. 32
Mexican American and Mrican American applications were
reviewed by a three member subcommittee rather than the

LSAT (10) (GPA) = TI. [d. at 935 n.l.
25. [d. at 935. Other factors considered by the Law School included an
applicant's undergraduate performance, the applicant's undergraduate major, down·
ward/upward grade trends and grade inflation. The admissions committee also
looked at the individual applicant's personal perspective and life experiences. Texas
residents were given significant additional consideration. Therefore, residency also
played a strong role in an applicant's chance for admission. [d.
26. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 935; Hopwood v. Texas, 861 F. Supp. 551, 563 (W.O.
Tex. 1994).
27. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 935.
28. [d. To be presumptively admitted, the TI number for non-minorities was
199, whereas the TI for African Americans and Mexican Americans was 189. The
TI too low for acceptance for non-minorities was 192, while the TI number for
African Americans and Mexican Americans was 179. Therefore, a minority candidate with a TI of 189 or above almost certainly was admitted, even though this
score was 3 points below the TI score a non-minority applicant receives for a Presumptive Deny. [d. at 936.
29. [d. at 935-36.
30. [d. at 936.
31. Hopwood F.3d at 936-37. As the Hopwood court pointed out, a TI score of
189 was a presumptive denial of admission for non-minority applicants, whereas
the same TI score constituted a presumptive admit for African American and Mexican American candidates. [d. at 937.
32. [d. at 937-38. The school color-coded applications according to race. [d. at
937.
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general admissions committee used to evaluate all other applications. 33 In 1992, the three member subcommittee consisted
of one African American male, a Mexican American male and a
white male.34
Hopwood, Carvell, Elliot, and Rogers had respective TI
scores of 199 (presumptive admit),35 197, 197, and 197 (discretionary zone).36 None received review under the affirmative
action admissions program. 37 The Law School denied admission to all four of these applicants. 38
These four applicants sued the Law School and the State
of Texas in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Texas. 39 The plaintiffs based their claims on a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause under the Fourteenth Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution, statutory violations of 42 U.S.C. §§
1981, 1983, and Title VI 'of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2000d.40 The plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief, as well as compensatory and punitive damages. 41
The district court applied strict scrutiny,42 the most elevated standard of review, to the Law School admission policy
because the policy used race as a primary factor in considering
applicants. 43 Under strict scrutiny review, the district court
required the state to show that its use of race as a basis for
admissions furthered a compelling government interest and
that its admissions policy was the most narrowly tailored
means of achieving that interest. 44

33. [d. at 937. The decisions of the three member sub-committee were considered "virtually final." Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 937.
34. Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 560 n.20.
35. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 938. Cheryl Hopwood was subsequently downgraded
to the discretionary zone for resident whites because a member of the admissions
committee felt her "educational background overstated the strength of her GPA"
[d.
36. [d.
37. [d.
38. [d.

39. Hopwood, 861 F. Supp, at 551.
40. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 938.
41. [d.

42. [d.
43. [d.
44. [d.
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In attempting to meet the standard of strict scrutiny, the
State of Texas and the Law School claimed that one of the
primary purposes of the affirmative action admissions program
was to promote diversity at the Law School.45 The Supreme
Court in Bakke held this goal to be a compelling governmental
interest, a fact undisputed by the Hopwood plaintiffs and upheld by the district court. 45 The Law School maintained that
Mrican Americans and Mexican Americans had been traditionally under-represented at the school and the affirmative action
admissions program sought to increase minority representation
in the classroom:? The Law School wanted to provide students with a diverse classroom atmosphere to "prepare students for real world functioning of the law in our diverse nation."45 Despite recognition of the Bakke holding, plaintiffs
argued that Supreme Court precedent after Bakke indicates
that affirmative action programs will only be permissible if the
program is implemented to remedy the present effects of past
discrimination. 49 Therefore, the plaintiffs alleged, diversity is
no longer considered a compelling governmental interest.
The Law School also claimed that Texas had a history of
discrimination in education. 50 The effects of this discrimination continued at the Law School, both in the Law School's
reputation and in the level of education attained by the usual
minority applicant. 51 Therefore, the Law School argued, the
affirmative action admissions program also constituted remedial action. 52
The district court agreed with the Law School and found

45. Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 570.
46. Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978);
Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 570.
47. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 948.
48. Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 570.
49. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 944.
50. Id. at 948.
51. Id. At the trial level, the district court found that the evidence presented
at trial indicates those effects include the law school's lingering reputation in the
minority community, particularly with prospective students, as a 'white school'; an
under representation of minorities in the student body; and some perception that
the law school is a hostile environment for minorities. Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at
572.
52. Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 570.
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that the State of Texas and the University of Texas had a
history of discrimination against minorities. 53 Specifically, the
district court found that at the primary and secondary school
levels, minority students in Texas attended academically inferior minority schools compared with schools attended by, and
comprised of, primarily allwhite students. 54 The district court
recognized that as of May, 1994, over 40 Texas school districts
were defending desegregation lawsuits. 55
Additionally, the district court conceded that it was not
until 1969 that the Texas Constitutional provision mandating
separate schools for whites and minorities in higher education
was repealed. 56 The district court further found that this segregation policy resulted in the establishment of higher education minority schools that were inferior to those available to
whites. 57 The district court looked to the results of an investigation, held from 1978 to 1980, by the Office for Civil Rights
(hereinafter "OCR") which revealed that Texas had failed to
abolish segregation of Mrican Americans and whites in public
higher education. 58 The OCR investigation also found that
Hispanics were "significantly underrepresented in state institutions. "59
Within the Law School itself, the district court noted that,
aside from segregation, the most blatant example of discrimination occurred in Sweatt v. Painter. 6o In Sweatt, the Supreme Court. held that the State of Texas and the Law School
violated the Equal Protection clause by denying admission to
Heman Sweatt, an African American male. 61 The Supreme
Court ordered that Sweatt be admitted to the Law Schoo1. 62

53. [d. at 575.
54. [d. at 554.
55. [d.

56. ld. See also, TEx. CONST. art. VII, §7 (1925, repealed 1969).
57. Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 555. See also Commentary, 'rEx. CONST. art.
VII, §14 (West 1993).
58. Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 556.
59. [d.
60. [d. at 555; Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
61. Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 636.
62. [d. Sweatt failed to graduate when he prematurely left the Law School in
1951 "after being subjected to racial slurs from students and professors, cross
burning, and tire slashing. Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 555.
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In addition to Sweatt, the district court found that throughout
the 1950's and 1960's the University of Texas regularly engaged in discriminatory practices against African Americans
and Mexican Americans. 63
Despite the above findings by the district court, the plaintiffs in Hopwood alleged that the State failed to show any
tangible present effects of past discrimination. 64 The plaintiffs
claimed that the Law School was relying on the occurrences of
past discrimination in primary and secondary schools, instead
of particular instances of discrimination within the Law
Schoo1. 65
The district court held that the Law School violated the
plaintiffs' rights to Equal Protection under the U.S. Constitution. 66 This was not because the Law School failed to prove a
compelling governmental interest, however, but because the
Law School's affirmative action plan was not narrowly tailored
to achieve true diversity or remedy past discrimination. 67 Accordingly, the district court ordered that the Law School allow
the plaintiffs to reapply at no cost. 68 However, the district
court did not enjoin the Law School from considering race in
admissions. 69 It awarded the plaintiffs $1.00 in nominal damages and granted no compensatory or punitive damages. 7o
Both the Law School and the plaintiffs appealed the district
court decision. 71

63. Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 555. Specifically, the trial court noted that Mexican American students were placed in separate on campus residences known as
"barracks" in addition to being "excluded from membership in most universitysponsored organizations." Moreover African American students were forbidden from
living and even visiting white residence halls. [d.
64. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 948.
65. [d.
66. Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 579.
67. [d.
68. [d. at 583.
69. [d. at 582. The district court did not fmd injunctive relief appropriate since
the Law School voluntarily changed its special admissions plan by abandoning the
use of separate admissions committees for whites and minorities. [d.; See also
Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 958.
70. Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 583-85. The plaintiffs requested compensatory
damages based on their projected earnings as law school graduates. [d. at 583
n.90.
71. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 932.
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On March 18, 1996, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit returned a decision in which the majority reversed in
part and remanded in part the district court's decision. 72 In
its opinion, the majority examined and openly criticized
Bakke. 73 Although the Law School in Hopwood had articulated diversity as one of its goals in implementing the affIrmative
action program, the Fifth Circuit rejected this goal and held,
contrary to Supreme Court precedent, that diversity can never
be a compelling governmental interest in a public graduate
schoo1. 74 The Fifth Circuit held that the Law School's admissions practice discriminated in favor of minority applicants and
had therefore violated the Equal Protection rights of non-minority applicants. 75 Additionally, the Fifth Circuit stated that
the Law School should be limited to showing evidence of only
those instances of discrimination occurring within the Law
School, not at the primary and secondary school levels. 76 As a
result, the Fifth Circuit agreed with the plaintiffs and held
that the Law School had not suffIciently shown the existence of
the effects of past discrimination against Mrican Americans
and Mexican Americans. 77
Moreover, the Fifth Circuit held that the lower court had
erred in denying plaintiffs' request for compensatory damages
because the lower court failed to shift the burden of proof to
the defendants once the plaintiffs had established a violation of
their constitutional rights. 7s Therefore, the court remanded
the case to the district court for rehearing on the question of
damages. 79
The Law School and the plaintiffs appealed the Fifth Cir-

72. Id. at 962.
73. Id. at 944.
74. [d. In, the sole concurring opinion, Justice Wiener argued that while he
agreed with the majority opinion's conclusion in the instant case, he disagreed
with the court's holding that diversity can never be a compelling governmental interest in higher education. [d. at 962. Justice Wiener stated that if "Bakke is to
be declared dead, the Supreme Court, not a three judge-panel of a circuit court,
should make that pronouncement," Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 965.
75. [d. at 962.
76. Hopwood 78 F.3d at 953-54.
77. Id. at 955.
78. Id. at 956-57.
79. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 962.
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cuit decision to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court denied
certiorari in August of 1996. 80
III. BACKGROUND
According to the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, all persons shall receive equal protection
of the law, regardless of race.81 The Equal Protection Clause
provides two guarantees. 82 First, people similarly situated
must be treated the same. 83 Second, people not similarly situated must be treated differently.84 The Hopwood plaintiffs argued that because the Law School's secondary admissions
policy reserved a certain percentage of incoming class seats
solely for minorities, it denied non-minorities equal protection
because it treated them differently.85
A. EQUAL PROTECTION

The original purpose of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment was to ensure that newly freed slaves·
received equal treatment from state law. 86 Throughout its 130
year history, the Equal Protection Clause has been the subject
of varying interpretations. 87

80. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), rev'd 861 F. Supp. 551
(W.D. Tex. 1994), cert denied 116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996).
81. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Specifically, the Fourteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution states in part: "No State shall make or enforce
any law which shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
82. LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 1438 (Foundation Press,
2d ed. 1988).
83. [d.
84. [d.
85. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 938 (5th Cir. 1996).
86. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 542, 544 (1896).
87. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896); See also, Brown v. Board of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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B. CASE LAw INTERPRETING THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE

1. Plessy v. Ferguson
One of the first and most notable cases interpreting the
scope of the Equal Protection clause occurred in the landmark
case, Plessy v. Ferguson. 88 In Plessy, the Supreme Court held
that a statute mandating separate train cars for blacks and
whites did not violate the Equal Protection Clause provided
that the train cars had equal facilities for both races. 89 The
Plessy Court created the infamous doctrine of "separate but
equal" in holding that so long as the separate facilities for both
whites and blacks were equal, they were constitutionally permissible. 90 The plaintiff in Plessy argued that train cars for
blacks were substandard to those train cars reserved for
whites. 91 The plaintiff also argued that being forced to ride in
separate train cars caused psychological injury to blacks because of the implication that blacks were inferior to whites. 92
The Supreme Court, however, found both races were treated
equally under the statute.93 The Court stated that any psychological effects suffered by the, black population were not a
result of the law, but were the result of a choice by blacks to
feel inferior. 94

2. Brown v. Board of Education
In reality, after the Supreme Court's decision in Plessy,
separate facilities for white and blacks were usually far from
equal. 95 The most notable disparity occurred in the school systems, where schools for blacks were often grossly inferior to
schools for whites. 96 Despite this evident inequality, the Supreme Court did not reconsider the constitutionality of the
separate but equal doctrine in public education until Brown v.
88. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
89. ld. at 548-51.
90. ld. at 551.
91. ld.
92.ld.
93. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 537-38, 551-52.
94. ld. at 551.
95. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
96. ld.
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Board of Education, fifty-eight years after Plessy.97
In 1954, due to a changing society, the inherent inequities
of the separate but equal doctrine, and the importance of education,98 the Supreme Court essentially overruled Plessy.99 In
Brown, the Court held that the separate but equal doctrine
was unacceptable with regard to public education because it
denied Mrican Americans the opportunity of a comparable
non-minority education. loo Therefore, it held the separate but
equal doctrine violated the Equal Protection Clause. lOl The
Court added that segregation in education did create notions of
inferiority among black children and rejected any contrary
language in Plessy. 102
The following year in Brown II,103 the Supreme Court declared that the desegregation of the public schools should occur
"with all deliberate speed,"l04 but the Court failed to articulate a specific process for desegregation.l05 Rather, the Court
allowed the states and local school boards to determine their
own processes for desegregation. l06 As a result, desegregation
did not begin to occur until a subsequent series of cases. l07 A
notable example of the failure to follow the Brown ruling oc-

97. [d. at 491-92.
98. [d. at 493.
99. [d. at 495. Although the Supreme Court did not explicitly overrule Plessy
in its decision, Brown is considered to have effectively overruled Plessy. The Supreme Court held "[w]e conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine
of 'separate but equal' has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently
unequal." Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
100. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
101. [d.
102. [d. at 494-95.
103. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
104. [d. at 30l.
105. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
106. [d. at 300-01.
107. See e.g., Green v. County Sch. Bd. of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430
1968) ("Freedom of Choice" plan struck down as discriminatory); Griffin v. County
Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964) (county ordered schools closed rather than comply
with a desegregation order); Goss v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 683 (1963) (striking
down school transfer plan that promoted discrimination as invalid). Many states
were reluctant to abolish segregation due to the racially hostile environment of the
time. It was feared and desegregation was known to cause, violent outbursts from
anti-desegregation groups. See generally Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294
(1955).
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curred at the University of Texas. lOB
In 1954, the state of Texas required the maintenance of
segregated schools. 109 Despite the Brown rulings, this policy
was not repealed until 1969. 110 Moreover, throughout the
1950's and 1960's the University of Texas consistently engaged
in discriminatory practices against African American and Mexican American students. III
In 1968, the Supreme Court in Green v. County School
Board forced the school boards to comply with Brown and
ordered the immediate desegregation of schools.l12 The Court
declared that the time for deliberate speed had passed and
held that any continued segregation would not be tolerated. us

C. THE

EVOLUTION OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION

Several years after Brown and its progeny, universities
and colleges attempted to remedy past and/or continuing discrimination in the school systems by implementing "affirmative
action" programs for women and minorities. 114 Affirmative
action programs were meant to increase and encourage minority participation in higher education.115 Examples of such programs have included outreach plans, in which minorities are
specifically targeted by schools for recruitment, magnet schools
designed to desegregate school districts, and special math and
science programs for women and minorities. U6

108. Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 555.
109. ld.
110. ld.
111. ld.
112. Green v. County Sch. Bd of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
113. ld. at 438.
114. GERALD GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, 751819 (Foundation Press, 12th ed. 1991) [hereinafter GUNTHER]. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY states these programs are considered "positive steps designed to eliminate
existing and continuing discrimination, to remedy lingering effects of past discrimination, and to create systems and procedures to prevent future discrimination.
These affirmative action plans are commonly based on population percentages of
minority groups in a particular area." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 38 (6th ed. 1991).
115. See generally GUNTHER, supra note 114.
116. David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Understanding AffirTTl4tive Action, 23
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Due to the lasting and very negative effects of continued
discrimination against minorities, schools and businesses initiated affirmative action plans to help remedy the racial disparity that discrimination has caused.l17 The Supreme Court has
generally permitted such programs for diversity purposes
and/or to remedy past discrimination. us However, the Supreme Court has set certain guidelines and constitutional limits on these programs to decrease potential abuse. U9 Such
limits include subjecting race-based affirmative action programs to strict scrutiny and prohibiting the use of inflexible
quotas, since such a practice uses race as the only factor for
placement. 120
.
1. Diversity in Education is a Compelling Governmental
Interest
The Supreme Court has held that race can be considered a
factor in school admissions in order to further classroom diversity.121 In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, the
Supreme Court held that racial diversity in public education
may be a compelling governmental interest, but race may not
be the only factor used to establish diversity.122 Accordingly,
the Supreme Court found that the UC-Davis Medical School's
(hereinafter "Medical School") admissions plan violated the
U.S. Constitution because the plan used race as the only factor
in deciding to accept certain applicants. 123
Analogous to the applicants in Hopwood, the Medical

HAsTINGS CONST. L.Q. 921, 931-932 (Summer 1996) [hereinafter Oppenheimer].
117. Randall Kennedy, Persuasion and Distrust: A Comment on the Affirmative
Action Debate, 99 HARv. L. REv. 1327 (April 1986).
118. See e.g., Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265
(holding that diversity is a compelling governmental interest); Adarand Constructors Inc. v. Pens, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995) (holding that remedial action can be a
compelling governmental interest where strong evidence of past discrimination
exists).
119. Oppenheimer, supra note 116, at 935.
120. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pens, 115 S. Ct 2097 (1996); City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Wygant v. Jackson Board of
Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
121. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-19.
122. [d.
123. [d. at 315.
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School denied Bakke admission on two separate occasions,
despite a higher undergraduate grade point average and entrance exam score than other applicants who were accepted
under the Medical School's affirmative action admissions policy.124 At the time Bakke applied, the Medical School used two
separate admissions standards, one being a regular admissions
program and the other a "special" admissions program. 125 The
special admissions committee consisted primarily of members
of minority groupS.126 The purpose of the "special" admissions
program was to provide applicants from economically or educationally disadvantaged backgrounds the opportunity to be
admitted when they otherwise would not because their applications did not meet traditional academic requirements. 127 The
Medical School reserved 16 of the 100 seats exclusively for
those applicants accepted under this program. 128 Applicants
checked a box on their applications stating that they wanted
consideration under the special admissions program.129 The
Medical School admissions committee did not automatically
reject prospective students scrutinized under the special admissions program due to a low grade point average, nor did
they rank them against those applicants in the regular admissions pool. 130
Although many disadvantaged white applicants requested
consideration under the special admissions standards, none
were ever admitted under that program. 131 The admissions
committee did not consider Bakke under the special admis- .
siorts program in either year he applied to the Medical School,
since the admissions committee did not consider him economically or educationally disadvantaged. 132
124. ld. at 276-77.
125. ld. at 272-73. Under the "regular" or standard admissions program, the
Medical School granted interviews to applicants with grade point averages of 2.5
or above on a 4.0 scale. Upon completion of the interview, the school awarded the
applicant an overall score based on the interview ranking, the applicant's grade
point average, and other considerations. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 273-74.
126. ld. at 274.
127. ld. at 272-73. The Medical School conceded that its purpose in formulating
the plan was to increase minority enrollment. ld. at 280 n.14.
128. ld. at 289.
129. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 274.
130. Id. at 275.
131. ld. at 276.
132. ld. When Bakke applied in 1973, four of the special admissions seats re-
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Bakke sued UC-Davis Medical School, claiming it excluded
him from consideration under the special admissions program
based solely on his race. l33 Furthermore, he claimed that the
special admissions program violated his constitutional rights
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 134
The Supreme Court held that the special admissions program discriminated on the basis of race. l35 Since the Court
considered race a suspect classification, it analyzed the special
admissions program using the standard of strict scrutiny. 136
The Medical School argued four compelling governmental interests to justify the racial classification in its special admissions program: 1) increasing minority representation in medical schools and in the medical profession; 2) remedying the
effects of discrimination; 3) increasing the number of practicing
physicians in under-served communities; and 4) attaining a
diverse student body.137
The Supreme Court found that the Medical School's desire .
to have and maintain a diverse student body was the only
constitutionally permissible and compelling reason for the
mained open and even more were open when he again applied in 1974. [d. at 27677.
133. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 277-78.
134. [d. The Fourteenth Amendment states in part that "[n]o State shall make
or enforce any law which shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.; Title VI of the 1964
Civil Rights Act states in part that: "No person in the United States shall, on the
ground of race, color; or national origin, be excluded from. participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or
activity receiving Federal fmancial assistance." Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act.
135. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 320.
136. [d. at 289-91. There are three types of scrutiny depending on the classifier.
The court will use strict scrutiny, the most elevated level of review, for classifiers
based on race and nationality. Here, the government must show a compelling
interest in the classifier coupled with the least discriminatory method and narrowly tailored means of accomplishing that interest. Classifiers based on illegitimacy
and gender will receive a middle level of review, known as intermediate scrutiny.
Here, the government must demonstrate that the classification is substantially
related to an important governmental interest. For all other classifiers, the court
will apply minimal scrutiny. In those instances, the classification must relate to a
permissible governmental interest, and cannot be arbitrary. See Gunther, supra
note 114.
137. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 305-06.
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affirmative action program. 13S However, the "fatal flaw"139
of the Medical School's special admission plan was that it considered only African Americans, Asians,14O or Hispanics for
the 16 reserved seats. 141 The Court held this was impermissible because race was the only factor used to decide who would
obtain placement among those ·16 seats. l42 The Court also
found objectionable the idea that minority applicants received
consideration under both the special and regular admissions
programs,l43 while non-minority applicants received consideration under only the regular admissions. l44 The Court stipulated that it did not reject the consideration of race as a basis
for establishing diversity.l45 It did hold however, that race
could not be used as the sole factor for admission. 145
2. Remedying Past Discrimination
The Supreme Court has permitted affirmative action programs to remedy the effects of past discrimination in addition
to diversity. 147 In City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson CO.,t48
the Court held that remedying past discrimination also constitutes a compelling governmental interest sufficient to support
an affirmative action plan. 149 Consequently, preferences for
members of ethnic and minority groups are permissible, provided the government adequately demonstrates the present

138. [d. at 307-12.
139. [d. at. 320
140. [d. at 275-76. It is difficult to see how Asians were underrepresented at
the Medical School prior and during the adoption of the Medical School's special
admissions plan. The Medical School admitted several Asians annually through the
regular admissions procedure. [d. at 276 n.6.
141. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 319-20.
142. [d.

143. [d. In his opinion, Justice Powell states, "No matter how strong their (nonminority applicants) qualifications, quantitative and extracurricular, including their
own potential for contribution to educational diversity, they are never afforded the
chance to compete with applicants from the preferred groups for the special admissions seats. At the same time, the preferred applicants have the opportunity to
compete for every seat in the class." [d.
144. [d. at 319.
145. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 318.
146. [d.

147. City of Richmond v. JA Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 509 (1989).
148. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
149. [d. at 493-94.
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effects of past discrimination. 150 According to the Court, strict
scrutiny is met when the government shows strong evidence of
past discrimination 151 and a purpose to overcome or remedy
that particular past discrimination. 152 However, the Court
specified that the government may not use a race-based plan
in cases where merely past general or societal discrimination
has been shown. 153
3. Strong Basis in Evidence of Past Discrimination
In order for remedial past discrimination to pass the strict
scrutiny test, there must be strong evidence of past discrimination.lM In Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,155 the Supreme Court stated that while official findings of past discrimination are not required, strong evidentiary support must be
present to conclude that remedial action is necessary.l56 In
Wygant, the Supreme Court struck down a Mississippi school
board's lay-off policy favoring recently hired black teachers
over white teachers with seniority.157 The Court held the layoffs unconstitutional since the school board had not shown any
specific prior discrimination against black teachers· which
would justify such a policy.15s The Court held that the fact
that society had historically discriminated against African
Americans was insufficient to show a compelling governmental

150. [d. at 509.
151. Wygant v. Jackson Board of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277 (plurality opinion)
(1986).
152. Croson, 488 U.S. at. 475.
153. [d. at 505-06. "To accept Richmond's claim that past societal discrimination
alone can serve as the basis for rigid racial preferences would be to open the door
to competing claims for 'remedial relief for every disadvantaged group." [d.
154. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 277.
155. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
156. [d. at 277. The Jackson, Mississippi school system had a majority of white
teachers and relatively few black teachers. To remedy this, the Board of Education
took affirmative steps to raise the number of black teachers. Due to economic
problems, .teacher lay-offs subsequently became necessary. Accordingly, The Board
of Education modified their lay-off policy so that the same percentage of black and
white teachers would be laid off, regardless of seniority. Consequently, white
teachers who were laid off and who had more seniority than other black teachers
who were retained, claimed Equal Protection violations. See generally Wygant v.
Jackson Board of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
157. [d. at 283-84.
158. [d.
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interest in the remedy.159

a. Numerical Set-Asides Permissible
Like quota systems which establish a definite number of
spots for minorities/so set-aside programs consist of fixed
percentages "set aside" for minority placement within an organization or a school. 161 Although generally disfavored, the Supreme Court has indicated that numerical set-asides for minorities would be permitted in cases showing clear evidence of
past and/or ongoing discrimination against minorities. 162
In United States v. Paradise/53 the Court upheld a court
order mandating the State of Al~bama to hire one black state
trooper for every white state trooper hired. l64 The Supreme
Court did so based on a judicial fmding that the State demonstrated past and continuous discrimination against blacks in
hiring Alabama state troopers. l65 The Court later specified
that flexible numerical set-asides could be used to remedy past
discrimination, provided they are used for a limited duration,
are based on pertinent racial percentages in the relevant population, impose relatively light burdens on non-minorities, and
apply only when no other effective "race-neutral" remedies are
available. 166
b. Strict Scrutiny Required
In Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,167 the Supreme
159. [d. at 276.
160. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 288-89, p.289 n.26.
161. City of Richmond v. JA Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
162. Wygant v. Jackson Board of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
163. United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987).
164. [d. at 185-86.
165. [d.
166. Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers' International Ass'n v. EEOC,. 478
U.S. 421, 482-83 (1986) (Five-Justice majority upheld court order mandating a
'hiring goal' of 29% minority membership in a private union that had a history of
discrimination).
167. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
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Court ruled that courts must apply strict scrutiny whenever
the government uses race as a basis for its affirmative action
plans. l68 The majority in Adarand held that application of
the more permissive intermediate review to governmental
actions undermined the "basic principle that the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments ... protect persons, not groups. "169
Under strict scrutiny review, courts must hold the affirmative action program impermissible if: 1) the state fails to show
that its purpose or interest in the affirmative action program is
both constitutionally permissible and compelling; 2) its use of
the classification is necessary and narrowly tailored to achieve
that purpose;170 and 3) the state's method in protecting its
interest is the least discriminatory method available. 171 Furthermore, the Supreme Court in Adarand explicitly stated that
a government's affirmative action plan could survive strict
scrutiny if it is in response to "the lingering effects of racial
discrimination" against certain minorities, and its race-conscious method was narrowly tailored. 172
N. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS
The Fifth Circuit in Hopwood began its analysis by stating
that the overriding purpose of the Equal Protection Clause is
"ultimately to render the issue of race irrelevant in governmental decision-making"173 and eliminate governmentally mandated discrimination. 174 The Fifth Circuit in Hopwood held
that any program employing racial classifications was subject
to strict scrutiny to "smoke out"175 improper racial considerations by ensuring that governmental interest is great enough

168. Id. at 2113. In doing so, the Court overruled Metro Broadcasting Inc. v.
FCC, which held that the appropriate level of review in these instances was intermediate scrutiny. The Supreme Court explained that Metro had significantly departed from the continuing trend of using strict scrutiny to review affirmative action plans. Id. at 2112-13.
169. Id. at 2112-13.
170. Id. at 2117.
171. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
172. Id. at 2117-18.
173. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 939-940 (5th Cir. 1996).
174. Id. at 939-40.
175. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989).
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to warrant· this highly suspect classification. 176 Additionally,
the use of strict scrutiny requires that the means chosen is
narrowly tailored to a compelling state goal so that little or no
possibility remains that the motive for the racial classification
is impermissible. 177 The court pointed out that arguments
conferring benefits on individuals based solely on race or ethnicity had been consistently rejected by the Supreme
COurt. 17S

A.

MAJORITY

1. No Compelling Governmental Interest

The majority opinion in Hopwood held that the government may never consider race as a factor in college admissions
decisions because that violates the Equal Protection
Clause. 179 The court further held diversity is never a compelling governmental interest,lS0 and, therefore, does not survive
the standard of strict scrutiny in college affirmative action
admissions programs. 181
The Fifth Circuit found that the Law School had an interest identical to that held permissible and compelling in
Bakke,ls2 but stated that the Supreme Court has never reaffirmed diversity as a compelling governmental interest since
Bakke. l83 In addition, the Hopwood court found Bakke inconclusive in determining whether racial considerations are constitutional in school admissions programs because six Justices
in Bakke filed separate opinions. l84 The Bakke Court did not
reach a consensus on a justification for its decision, and only
Justice Powell had articulated that diversity was a compelling

176. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 940.
177. [d.
178. [d. at 941.
179. [d. at 944, 948.
180. [d. at 948. .
181. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 948.
182. [d. at 943. The Hopwood court noted that because the Law School argued
one of the purposes of the afimnative action program was to promote classroom
diversity, it had invoked a countervailing constitutional interest to that expressed
in Bakke. [d.
183. [d. at 944.
184. [d.
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governmental interest. 185
The Fifth Circuit stated that Justice Powell's holding in
Bakke was not a m~ority opinion and never fully embraced by
the m~ority of the COurt. 186 In fact, the Hopwood court pointed out, even the four dissenting Justices in Bakke who would
have upheld the Medical School's admissions program under
intermediate scrutiny rejected Justice Powell's position that
diversity is a compelling governmental interest. 1S7 The
Hopwood majority also stated that later Supreme Court decisions held state interests that are not remedial will never
justify racial preferences in higher education. 186 The m~ority
in Hopwood further commented that recent Supreme Court
precedent indicates that diversity will not satisfy strict scrutiny.l89 Moreover, the Fifth Circuit noted that diversity takes
many forms and that racial considerations do not necessarily
create classroom diversity.l90 Accordingly, the m~ority in
Hopwood held that diversity, the goal enunciated by the Law
School and upheld in Bakke, is not a compelling governmental
interest. 191

a. Race Based Preferences Exacerbate the Goals of Equal
Protection
The Hopwood m~ority ultimately held that racial considerations for diversity purposes in higher education actually
contradict the goals of equal protection. l92 In advancing the
argument elaborated in Croson, the m~ority concluded that
preferences based on race exacerbate rather than facilitate the
goals of equal protection by treating minorities as a group and
not as individuals. 193

185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 944.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 947, 933 n.3.
[d. at 948.
[d. at 945, 947-48; See also Croson, 488 U.S. at 493.
Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 945.
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b. Remedy to Past Discrimination
The Fifth Circuit next turned to the district court's finding.
that the Law School's affirmative action plan was remedial. 194 Contrary to the district court, the Fifth Circuit held
that the Law School had not demonstrated a sufficient compelling state interest in remedying the present effects of past
discrimination. 195 Relying on Wygant and Croson, the Fifth
Circuit held that in order to implement a remedial program
based on race, strong evidence must indicate that the remedial
action was necessary.l96 The Fifth Circuit acknowledged that
affirmative action plans based on race could be used to remedy
the effects of past discrimination. 197 The Hopwood court also
recognized however, that the Supreme Court explicitly rejected
broad state programs adopted to remedy general societal discrimination, the only type of discrimination the Fifth Circuit
determined the Law School had demonstrated. 198
Consequently, the Fifth Circuit held that a state institution of higher learning may not remedy the past effects of
discrimination occurring at primary and secondary schools. 199
The court ruled that the district court erred in holding that the
Law School had sufficiently proven past discrimination by
demonstrating the occurrence of discrimination· at the primary
and secondary levels of education. 2°O The Fifth Circuit .stated
that such a relationship is too remote and goes "beyond any

194. Hopwood v. Texas, 861 F. Supp. 551, 573 (W.D. Tex. 1994).
195. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 955.
196. Id. at 948-49.
197. Id. at 949.
198. Id. at 949-50.
199. Id. at 953-54.
200. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 954. The m~ority 8tated that while the law school
did engage in prior discrimination against blacks, "any other discrimination by the
law school ended in the 1960's". Id. at 953. "By the late 1960's, the school had
implemented its flrBt program designed to recruit minorities, and it now engages
in an extensive minority recruiting program that includes a significant amount of
scholarship money. The vast m~ority of the faculty, staff, and students at the law
school had absolutely nothing to do with any discrimination that the law school
practiced in the past. In such a case, one cannot conclude that a hostile environment is the present effect of past discrimination." Id.
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reasonable limits. "201 The majority explained that in Croson
the Supreme Court specifically rejected remedial measures
such as those utilized by the Law School, holding that claims
of discrimination in primary and secondary schools were
"amorphous"202 and without merit. 203 Therefore, the Fifth
Circuit held that the Law School could not use race as a factor
to eliminate any present effects of prior discrimination by persons other than the Law Schoo1. 204

c. Poor Reputation in the Minority Community and Hostile
Environment
The Fifth Circuit also ruled that the Law School could not
take race into account in order to alter its poor reputation in
the minority community.205 Due to its unfavorable history of
discrimination, the Law School claimed, and the district court
agreed, it had a poor reputation among minorities and was
viewed as a "white institution. "206 As a result, the Law School
had a difficult time attracting and recruiting qualified and/or
exceptional minorities to the Law Schoo1. 207 The district court
found that recent incidents at the Law School such as those
occurring in Sweatt, contributed to the perception of a hostile
environment to minorities. 208 Therefore, without affinnative
action programs, the Law School would have an extremely low
minority student body.209 The Fifth Circuit rejected these
findings and noted that minority students who benefited from
the Law School's racial preferences had already made the decision to apply, regardless of the Law School's reputation. 210
Moreover, while knowledge that a minority applicant will receive special consideration may make a minority more likely to
apply, this inducement in itself does not change an alleged hos-

201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

[d. at 951.
Croson, 488 U.S. at 499.
[d. at 950.
Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 954 n.46.
[d. at 953.
Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 572.
[d.
[d.
[d. at 573 n.66.
Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 953.
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tile environment. 211 Consequently, the Fifth Circuit held that
the Law School could not use race as a factor in order to alleviate the Law School's flawed reputation or to combat the perceived effects of a hostile environment among minorities. 212
2. Insufficient Narrow Tailoring to Achieve a Compelling Interest
To satisfy strict scrutiny, the government must demonstrate that the method used to achieve its compelling interest
is narrowly tailored. 213 Because the Fifth Circuit determined
that diversity is never a compelling governmental interest and
that the Law School failed to show any lingering effects of past
discrimination, the coUrt found it unnecessary to address
whether the Law School's admissions program was narrowly
tailored to fit the impermissible interest.214
3. Violation Not Harmless
The Fifth Circuit held that because the Law School admissions program did not survive strict scrutiny, the Law School
violated the plaintiffs' constitutional rights. 215 In order for the
plaintiffs to collect monetary damages, they needed to show
injury as a result of the constitutional violation. 216 However,
the Fifth Circuit declared that once the plaintiffs established a
constitutional violation, the burden shifted to the Law School
to show that they would not have been accepted absent the
affirmative action admissions program. 217
The Fifth Circuit found that the district court failed to
shift the burden to the defendant to prove the plaintiffs had
211. [d.
212. [d.
213. See supra note 44; See also Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 938. (for a brief discussion of strict scrutiny).
214. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 955.
215. [d. at 962.
216. [d. at 956.
217. [d. at 955-57. See Mount Healthy City School Dist. Bd of Educ. v. Doyle,
429 U.S. 274 (1977) and Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev.
Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (Fifth Circuit in Hopwood relying on Mount Healthy
and Arlington Heights for analysis regarding shifting of burden).
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not suffered any harm. 218 If the Law School could show that
the plaintiffs would not have been accepted absent the secondary admissions program, the violation would be held harmless
and the plaintiffs would not collect compensatory damages. 219
However, because the Law School's use of race violated
plaintiffs constitutional rights, the appellate court held that
they had to be allowed to reapply under a new admissions
program under which race was not a consideration. 220 The
court remanded the case to the district court to reconsider the
issue of damages. 221
B. CONCLUSION

The Fifth Circuit ultimately rejected the four justifications
advanced by the Law School in support of the school's affinnative action admissions program. First, and in direct conflict
with Supreme Court precedent, the Fifth Circuit held that
diversity is not a compelling governmental interest, and that
the Law School may not use race as a factor in admissions
decisions to achieve diversity.222 Second, the Hopwood court
ruled that the Law School failed to demonstrate its admissions
plan was remedial because the Law School provided insufficient evidence that it previously discriminated against minorities. 223 The Fifth Circuit held that the Law School's contention that it had a poor reputation among minority communities
did not demonstrate past discrimination. 224 Finally, the
Hopwood court stated that perceptions of a hostile. environment do not justify the use of racial considerations in admitting applicants. 225 In this instance, the court noted that the
use of race as a consideration may be particularly detrimental

218. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 957.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 962.
221. Id.
222. Id. The Fifth Circuit went on to state that the University of Texas School
of Law could not use race as a factor "to combat the perceived effects of a hostile
environment at the law school, to alleviate the law school's poor reputation in the
minority community; or to eliminate any present effects of past discrimination by
actors other than the law school." Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 962.
223. See supra notes 76-77, 194-203 and accompanying text.
224. See supra notes 204-211 and accompanying text.
225. See supra notes 204-211 and accompanying text.
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because such consideration facilitates racial hostility.226
Therefore, because the Law School's use of race violated
plaintiffs' constitutional rights, the Law School was ordered to
allow the plaintiffs to reapply under a new non-racially based
admissions program. 227 Finally, the Fifth Circuit remanded
the case to the district court on the issue of compensatory
damages. 228
C. SPECIAL CONCURRENCE

In a special concurring opinion, Judge Wiener agreed with
the majority's final ruling, but stipulated that the court's opinion should apply only to the case at bar. 229 Judge Wiener also
disagreed with the majority's analysis. 230
1. Diversity

While Judge Wiener agreed with the majority's final decision that the Law School's admissions plan was unconstitutional, he stated that the violation was due to insufficient narrow
tailoring, not an impermissible governmental interest.231
Judge Wiener disagreed with the majority's holding that diversity in public education can never constitute a compelling interest sufficient to withstand strict scrutiny.232 He stated that
such a holding is in clear conflict with Bakke. 233 Judge Wiener declared that if well-established Supreme Court precedent is
to be overruled, it should be done by the Supreme Court, not
the Fifth Circuit. 2M Judge Wiener conceded that Bakke was
the only opinion in which the Supreme Court declared diversity a compelling government interest. 236 Judge Wiener stated
however, that Justice Powell's singularity is precisely why he

226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 953.
[d. at 962.
[d.

[d.
[d. at 963-64.
Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 962, 965-66.
[d.
.
[d. at 963.
[d.
[d. at 964 n.18.
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found Bakke the most relevant Supreme Court statement on
the issue of diversity.236 In Judge Wiener's opinion, Justice
Powell's sole comment on the issue, without contrary commentary by a majority of the Court, further establishes Bakke as
current law. 237 Judge Wiener stated that if the issue of diversity comes up before the Supreme Court the Justices will have
no choice but to thoroughly examine Justice Powell's opinion in
Bakke. 238 Judge Wiener remarked that in holding that diversity is not a compelling governmental interest, the majority's
implication is that a remedial interest is the only interest
deemed compelling. 239
2. Narrow Tailoring Insufficient

Judge Wiener stated that the Fifth Circuit should not have
invalidated the affirmative action plan based on an impermissible government interest, but rather should have analyzed
whether the means used by the Law School was narrowly
tailored.240 Under a narrow tailoring test, Judge Wiener argued that the Law School's affirmative action admissions program would have failed. 241 He stated that African. Aniericans
and Mexican Americans are only two ethnic groups out of
many.242 Therefore, selecting only these two groups in granting special admissions treatment would not create classroom
diversity.243 Consequently, the Law School's admissions program resembled a quota system rather than a narrowly tailored· program to establish genuine diversity.244 Moreover,
Judge Wiener alleged that the diversity of which Justice
Powell spoke in Bakke "encompasses a far broader array of
qualifications and characteristics of which racial or ethnic
origin is but a single though important element. "245 Therefore, in scrutinizing the Law School's admission plan under

236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.

Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 964 n.18.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 964.
Id. at 962.
Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 966.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 965 (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 316).
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Justice Powell's expansive concept of diversity, the affirmative
action admissions program still falls short. 246

v.

CRITIQUE

The Fifth Circuit's opinion is flawed for several reasons.
Not only did the Fifth Circuit exceed its limited role of appellate review by disregarding Supreme Court precedent,247 but
it seriously undervalued the important role affirmative action
plays in higher education.
A. THE LIMITS OF FEDERAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

In holding that diversity is never a compelling governmental interest in higher education, the Fifth Circuit contradicts
Supreme Court precedent established almost twenty years ago
in Bakke. 248 Such a ruling by a federal court of appeals exceeds the permissible scope of appellate jurisdiction. 249 The
U.S. Constitution proscribes that the ultimate judicial power of
the United States resides in a single Supreme COurt.250 Pursuant to Title 28 of the United States Code Annotated Section
2072(a), "The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe
general rules of practice and procedure . . . for cases in the
United States district courts and courts of appeals. "251 Moreover, Title 28 mandates that the jurisdiction of the federal
courts of appeals is limited to final decisions rendered in lower

246. Hopwood, 78 F.3d. at 966. Judge Wiener states: "[T]he law school created
its own Catch-22 by advancing two putative compelling interests that ultimately
proved to produce so much internal tension as to damage if not fatally wound
each other. Under the banner of prior discrimination, Texas had no choice but to
single out blacks and Mexican-Americans, for those two racial groups were the
only ones of which there is any evidence whatsoever of defacto or dejure racial
discrimination by the State of Texas in the history of its educational system. But,
by favoring just those two groups and doing so with a virtual quota system for affirmative action in admissions, the law school estops itself from proving that its
plan to achieve diversity is ingenuous, much less narrowly tailored." [d. at 966
n.24.
247. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1291 (West 1993).
248. Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
249. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1291 (West 1993).
250. U.S. CONST. art. III, §1.
251. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2072(a) (West 1994).
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federal district COurtS.252 In Hopwood however, the Fifth Circuit surpassed its authority by declaring diversity in the classroom impermissible, in the absence of specific Supreme Court
concurrence on that issue. Consequently, the ruling of the
Fifth Circuit announcing that classroom diversity no longer
constitutes a compelling governmental interest to satisfy strict
scrutiny is erroneous and not binding. 253 To obey the Fifth
Circuit ruling in Hopwood would be to deny the law of the
Supreme Court as the ultimate authority.
Not only did the Fifth Circuit exceed the bounds of its
jurisdiction, but it did so without adequate justification. In
response to the district court's ruling and prior to the Fifth
Circuit holding, the Law School abandoned the affirmative
action admissions program in effect at the time the plaintiffs
applied. 2M Moreover, as Judge Wiener noted in his concurring opinion, the Fifth Circuit could have avoided contradicting
the Bakke issue of diversity by holding that the Law School's
admissions plan was not narrowly tailored. 255 In striking
down the Law School admissions plan on this basis, the Fifth
Circuit would not have exceeded its permissible scope of jurisdiction.
B. REMEDIAL ACTION ADDRESSED INSTEAD OF DIVERSITY

Relying heavily on the holdings of Croson and Adarand,
the Hopwood majority reasoned that diversity is never a compelling governmental interest, but that discrimination for remedial purposes is permissible. 256 However, neither Croson
nor Adarand articulate this bright line conclusion, nor do these
cases deal with diversity in higher education.257

252. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1291 (West 1993).
253. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1291 (West 1993).
254. Hopwood v. Texas, 861 F. Supp. 551, 582, 582 n.87 (W.D. Tex. 1994).
255. See supra notes 230, 239-245 and accompanying text.
256. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (1996).
257. See generally City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
See also Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct 2097 (1996).
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1. Croson

In Croson, the majority addressed the dangers of racial
classifications, the stigmatism attached to such classifications,258 and the need for strict scrutiny. 259 However, the
Croson court focused on the governmental interest of remedial
action in the employment context rather than diversity in
higher education. 260 The Court stated that it was skeptical of
the City's claim that the purpose in enacting racial preferences
in construction contracts was to remedy the effects of past discrimination. 261 The City failed to identify any specific discrimination against minorities in the construction industry,262
and the City's plan was based more on notions of societal discrimination against African Americans than on particularized
instances of discrimination. 263 The Court held that remedial
measures based solely on general societal discrimination is
impermissible}S. Moreover, the Court found the City of
Richmond's plan over inclusive since it randomly included all
minority groups, many of whom may not have suffered discrimination in Richmond. 265
Hopwood is similar to Croson in that the Law School argued its actions were remedial. 266 However, the Law School
also argued that its purpose in using race as a factor in admissions decisions was to create classroom diversity,267 an interest held to be compelling by the Supreme COurt. 266 In fact, in
Croson, Justice Stevens refused to limit the 'use of race solely

258. Croson, 488 U.S. at 493. The majority states "Classifications based on race
carry a danger of stigmatic harm. Unless they are strictly reserved for remedial
settings, they may in fact promote notions of racial inferiority and lead to politics
of racial hostility." 1d.
259. 1d.
260. 1d. at 511 (holding that remedial action is a permissible and compelling
governmental interest in the context of employment).
261. 1d. at 510-11.
262. Croson, 488 U.S. at 510-11.
263. 1d.
264. 1d. at 505-06.
265. 1d. at 506.
266. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
267. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
268. Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 561.
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for the purpose of remedial action. 269 In referencing recognized compelling governmental interests aside from remedial
action, Justice Stevens specifically cites to Justice Powell's
opinion in Bakke. 270 Therefore, Croson did not sufficiently
support a finding that the Court would not continue to hold
diversity as a compelling governmental interest.
Moreover, the district court noted that in United States v.
Fordice,271 the Supreme Court appeared to limit the rejection
of societal discrimination for remedial action to the context of
employment and not higher education.272

2. Adarand
In its application of Adarand, the Fifth Circuit appears to
have focused more on the concurring opinions of Justices
Thomas and Scalia, than on Justice O'Conner's majority opinion. 273 The Adarand Court overruled intermediate scrutiny as
the proper level of review for racial classifications and announced that all racial classifications must withstand strict
scrutiny.274 As in Croson, the Adarand Court focused on notions of remedial action, rather than diversity.275 Nevertheless, although the Adarand Court questions the Bakke decision, it does not overrule it.276 This evidences the Supreme
Court's choice to leave Bakke as binding precedent when presented with an opportunity to render Bakke invalid.
The Hopwood court focused and relied primarily on claims
of remedial state action in situations other than higher education. 277 This focus was too limited since the issue of diversity

269. Croson, 488 U.S. at 493 n.1, 511-12.
270. [d.
271. United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717 (1992).
. 272. Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 571.
273. Adarand Constructors Inc. v. Pens, 115 S. Ct 2097 (1992).
274. [d. at 2112-13.
275. Adarand Constructors Inc, v. Pens, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
276. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 96. The Court in Adarand states, "The [Supreme]
Court's failure to produce a majority opinion in Bakke, Fullilove, and Wygant left
unresolved the proper analysis for remedial race based governmental action."
Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 3002.
277. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 948-55.
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was not wholly addressed in Croson and Adarand. Rather than
dismiss diversity as impermissible, the Fifth Circuit should
have focused on the role diversity plays in the classroom and
whether the Law School's admissions program achieved diversity.
Until the Supreme Court takes a contrary position regarding the compelling nature of diversity in higher education,
Bakke is the law and classroom diversity is constitutionally
permissible. 278 Ironically, the Fifth Circuit states that to hold
diversity as a constitutionally permissible goal would be to
contradict the Supreme Court, which it admits it is "not authorized to challenge. "279
3. Importance of Diversity
The Fifth Circuit severely underestimates the importance
of diversity and the role it plays in the classroom. 280 The Law
School provided ample evidence to the district court as to the
substantial benefits derived from a diverse student body.281
In addition, several law school professors testified on behalf of
the Law School concerning the positive impact diversity has on
education, such as differing life experiences, overall outlook
and varying perspectives on similar issues. 282 The Fifth Circuit rejected this evidence and claimed that it was not color
that furthers diverse viewpoints, but "individuals, with their
own conceptions of life."283 The Fifth Circuit fails to acknowledge however, that conceptions and perceptions come from
different life experiences. Clearly a minority, simply by virtue
of being a minority and enduring the daily struggles of life as a
minority, will have a different conception of life than the white
majority.
The district court found that the Law School could not

278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.

Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 945-46.
[d. at 932.
Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 570-72.
[d.· at 571.
Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 946.
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obtain diversity without an affinnative action plan. 284 Moreover, relying solely on the TI score, minorities in the Law
School would be significantly underrepresented. 285 As the trial court noted, such a "meager representation" did not seem
appropriate in a state school funded in part by all Texas residents. 286 Consistent with these findings, the Fifth Circuit was
therefore hasty in discounting diversity as. a compelling state
interest.
4. Evidence of Past Discrimination Satisfied
As found by the district court in Hopwood, the state of
Texas has a history of unequal educational opportunities for
African Americans and Mexican Americans compared to educational opportunities for whites. 287 The Fifth Circuit itself acknowledged that Texas has a "history of racial discrimination
in education."288 According to the findings of the district
court, this. educational disparity is apparent as early as the
primary and secondary schooling levels, and extends to higher
education. 289 As recently as 1989, a study indicated that the
amount of spending allotted to San Antonio school children,
with a large Hispanic school population, was $2,800 per
child. 290 In the neighboring predominately white town of Alamo Heights however, the school system allotted each child
$4,600. 291
The Fifth Circuit rejected arguments that discrimination

284. Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 571.
285. [d. "Had the Law School ba8ed its 1992 admissions solely on the
applicants' TI without regard to race or ethnicity, the entering class would have
included, at most, nine blacks and eighteen Mexican Americans." [d.
286. [d. at 571 n.60.
287. See supra notes 53-59 and accompanying text.
288. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 954. The Fifth Circuit stated "No one disputes that
Texas has a history of racial discrimination in education." [d. Present effects include the fact that some minorities enrolled in the Law School feel isolated, are
reluctant to participate in class discussions, and some continue to feel a hostile racial environment at the Law School. Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 573.
289. See supra notes 54-59 and accompanying text.
290. JONATHAN KOZOL, SAVAGE INEQUALITIES, 224 (1992); Oppenheimer, supra
note 116, at 962.
291. [d.
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occurring at the primary and secondary levels was sufficient to
justify a remedial plan or to establish diversity at the Law
School. 292 Yet, the Law School takes residency into account
when determining whether to admit an applicant. 293 In order
to obtain federal and state funding as a public institution, the
Law School must accept a substantial majority of in-state applicants. 294
Statistical data indicates that African Americans, Mexican
Americans, and other minorities residing in Texas receive
substandard education as opposed to resident whites. 295 It is
difficult to see how this would not be relevant to the Law
School's admittance process. Such substandard educational
opportunities may have a domino effect. For example, inferior
education will result in lower test scores and grades fO.r minorities, which in turn may effect college admittance and/or lower
academic achievement in college. As evidenced by Cheryl
Hopwood's demotion from a presumptive admit to the discretionary zone, the Law School does take into account the academic quality of the applicant's undergraduate college. 296
Therefore, it would appear that discrimination in Texas at
the primary and secondary school levels is an important consideration, at least where resident minority applicants are
. competing for entrance with white resident applicants. Rather
than completely abolish race as a consideration in admissions
decisions, the Fifth Circuit could have adopted a far narrower
approach by limiting racial considerations to minority Texas
residents, whom the district court found receive inferior educational opportunities in Texas Schools.

292. See supra notes 199-203 and accompanying text.
293. Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 572.
294. Id. The Fifth Circuit recognized the important role residency played in
admitting applicants. Specifically, the Fifth Circuit majority stated "residency also
had a strong, if not determinate effect [in admissions]. Under Texas law in 1992,
the law school was limited to [accepting no more than] 15% non-residents."
Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 935 n.2.
295. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
296. Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 560.
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Moreover, the Fifth Circuit erred in determining that the
Law School failed to adequately prove discrimination within
the University of Texas. The district court listed ample evidence of the occurrence of past discrimination within the law
school and the remaining effects of prior discrimination lingering within the law school both in its reputation in the community and in the perception of the Law School as a hostile environment. 297
5. No Disadvantage
It is difficult to see how the four plaintiffs in Hopwood
were disadvantaged by the Law School's affirmative action
admissions plan. 29s The four plaintiffs were denied admission
for reasons other than their race. 299 For example, although
Cheryl Hopwood had a high grade point average, she attended
community colleges which the admissions committee deemed
as non-competitive schools. 3011 Moreover, Hopwood's application contained no letters of recommendation, she failed to respond to the application questions with any detail, she failed to
describe her background or any unique skills she possessed,
and she provided no personal statement with her application. 301

Plaintiff Kenneth Elliott had a grade point average of 2.98,
well below the mean grade point average of not only non-minority applicants, but also of minority applicants accepted
under the affirmative action admissions plan~ 302 Plaintiff
Douglas Carvell had a low LSAT score, and ranked only 98th

297. See supra notes 53-63 and accompanying text.
298. See Hopwood v. Texas, 861 F. Supp. 551 (W.D. Tex. 1994).
299. [d. at 580.
300. [d. at 564. Hopwood subsequently testified that the reason she attended
community colleges was "because she had to pay for her own education and had
to work her way through school." Therefore, she could not afford to attend more
prestigious schools. Hopwood did not provide this explanation in her application
even though the application requested that such information be provided if the
applicant "believe[d] [it] will help the Admissions Committee in evaluating [his or
her] application. [d. at 564 nAO.
301. [d. at 564.
302. Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 565-66. See also the mean ranges of accepted
applicants in Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 936-37, 937 n.7.
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in his undergraduate class of 247.303 Furthermore, a letter of
recommendation Carvell submitted to the Law School from a
previous professor described Carvell's academic performance as
"uneven, disappointing, and mediocre."304 Although Plaintiff
David Rogers had a respectable grade point average, he
flunked out of the University of Texas as an undergraduate.
305Like Hopwood, Rogers provided no letters of recommendation. 3°S Finally, plaintiffs' counsel conceded that they could
not prove that each of the plaintiffs were denied admission as
a result of the Law School's affirmative action plan. 307
VI. CONCLUSION
The consequences of this decision are far reaching because
of the binding effects on courts within the Fifth Circuit's jurisdiction, and because it stands out for other courts to see. AE.
the district court stated in its opinion, affirmative action programs are needed in our society due to its "lengthy history of
pervasive racism."308 The Fifth Circuit's decision clearly attempts to undermine these needed aiflI'lllative action plans.
It is likely however, that the Law School's admissions

program would have failed the strict scrutiny test if. the Fifth
Circuit had chosen to address this issue. 309 AE. Judge Wiener
surmised in his concurring opinion, many ininority communities exist which also contribute to diversity in the classroom
aside from African Americans and Mexican Americans. 310 The
Law School did not satisfactorily prove that other minority
groups were adequately represented at the Law School while
African and Mexican Americans were underrepresented. Therefore, it cannot stand to reason that the Law School's secondary
admissions program was narrowly tailored to achieve true
classroom diversity.

303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.

Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 566.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 582 0.86.
Hopwood, 861 F.3d at 583.
See Hopwood, 861 F.3d at 551; see Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 968.
310. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 968.
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Unfortunately, the Hopwood court refused to discuss the
issue of narrowly tailoring the affirmative action admissions
plan and instead denounced diversity altogether as a permissible and compelling governmental interest sufficient to satisfy
strict scrutiny. This seems to be a dramatic and unnecessary
leap for a three judge appellate panel lacking the legal authority to render precedent law invalid.
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